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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST OF
CHARLYNE FRANCIS MITCHELL,

l

Case No.
9003

Minor.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
Respondent is in substantial accord with the statement
of facts as contained in appellants' brief.
It should be particularly noted from an examination
of the transcript and reports contained herein that Shirley
Mitchell Holland, the mother, has for some considerable
period of time, been under close scrutiny by the Department
of Public Welfare and the custody of one child has been
subject to supervision by the Welfare Department, and the
Juvenile Court acting in its behalf. It should further be
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noted that the Stellys are not parties to this appeal, and
any arrangement made by the mother with the Stellys concerning an ostensible adoption is not a matter of proper
consideration for this court. While appellants' attorney
does in his statement make four assignments. of error, we
note that nowhere in his brief does he argue directly to the
assignments, but directs his attention purely to other statement of points.
In answer to appellants' brief on appeal and in opposition thereto, respondent makes the following statement of
points.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PETITION DOES ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON
THE JUVENILE COURT.

POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
LAW.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PETITION DOES ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON
THE JUVENILE COURT.
Appellant suggests that the petition (R. 22) does not
allege facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Juvenile Court. In this regard respondent cannot agree.
We refer the Court to the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 55-10-6, as follows:

"* * * The words 'neglected child' include:
"A child who is abandoned by his parent, guardian or custodian.
"A child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian or
custodian.
"A child whose parent * * * neglects
to provide proper or necessary subsistence *

* * *
* *"

A cursory examination of the petition discloses a recital of
facts abundantly sufficient to confer jurisdiction. By the
language of the petition itself, there is a declaration of
neglect strengthened by the allegations of the following
facts:
"The parents of said child are not married, certainly an element of irresponsibility. The father of
said child has never contributed to the support and
maintenance of said child and has deserted and abandoned said mother and said child. This clearly adopts
the language and intent of the statute. (2) The
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mother of said child placed said child in the home
of John Stelly, located at Ogden, Utah, and since
July, 1955, has failed to support and maintain said
child in any manner. Therefore said child is dependent upon the charity of others for her care, supervision and maintenance." Again a declaration of
lack of proper parental care, as contemplated by the
statute. (Italics ours.)
Respondents' position is unyielding in regard to conferring jurisdiction under the Utah statute above cited.
The attention of the Court is further directed to Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, 55-10-5, entitled "Jurisdiction of Juvenile
Courts." We make particular mention of subparagraph
(1) of said section, which provides:
"In any case in which the court shall find a
child neglected, dependent or delinquent, it may, in
the same or in any subsequent proceedings, upon
the parents of such child being duly summoned or
voluntarily appearing as hereinafter provided, proceed to inquire into the ability of such parents to
support the child or contribute thereto, or into the
fitness of such parents to continue in the custody
and control of such child. The court may enter such
order or decree as shall be according to law andjor
equity in the premises, and may enforce the same
in any way in which a court of law or equity may
enforce its orders or decrees."
Thus jurisdiction is clearly granted in the case here presented. Respondent cites the following case: In Re Olson,
111 Utah 365, 180 P. 2d 210. In the Olson case, the fact
that a third person was providing care for a child did not
deprive the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction to inquire into
the welfare of the child and to fix responsibility and de-
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termine custody for the child within the scope of statutory
authority. It is fundamental that where statutes govern
a situation conferring jurisdiction, considerations of jurisdiction are limited to the language of the statute and dicta
from other jurisdictions can in no way alter the clear and
convincing meaning as set forth in the statutes.
Appellant suggests that because the Court made a finding in the case of Charlyne contrary to the finding in the
case of Sharon, that this apparent inconsistency works in
support of the Court's error. On the contrary, even if such
an argument were material herein, it could only serve to
strengthen respondent's position for 'the reason that separate findings in each of the two separate cases show careful
and considered judgment on the part of the Court, and
show the evident concern which the Court had in arriving
at a fair conclusion. Appellant's conclusion cannot be supported by the transcript and record herein. It is apparent
that the evidence in the two separate cases was different
and the treatment of the child in each case by the mother
was as different as no doubt the personality of the child
itself.
We emphasize the fact that the argument concerning
the two separate cases would in no way alter the conferring
of jurisdiction by the Court upon the case of Charlyne
Francis Mitchell.

POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
Appellant asserts that even were the Court to assume
the petition was sufficient to justify inquiry, notwithstand-
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ing the evidence was totally insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Such is not a requirement of the law. Under Utah
law the petition need only allege facts sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. As to the evidence itself, this becomes a matter for determination by the Court and in no way affects
jurisdiction.
The record presents clear and convincing evidence sufficient to justify the judgment of the Court.
We refer the Court to the findings of fact and conclusions of law as contained in the record at R. 9. The findings of fact present the basis upon which the Court ruled
and found judgment against appellants. The findings of
fact make no mention of the mentality or mental health of
the mother of the children. The argument of appellant in
this regard is therefore without merit.
Appellant argues that the placement of the child with
the Stelly family shows evidence of proper care rather than
of neglect. With this we do not agree. Certainly where a
parent shifts his responsibility to that of another, and thereafter fails to recognize any parental care, it would be unreasonable to believe that by so doing they are not neglecting said child. Our Utah statute at 55-10-6 provides that
a neglected child shall be "a child who lacks proper parental
care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardiar
or custodian." The facts in this matter are clear that thE
child was· placed in the home of another person in order t<
avoid the parental responsibilities imposed by law upon thE
mother. It is interesting to note that until this matter wa1
brought formally before the Court, at no time did the ap·
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~ellants,

either the mother or Mr. and Mrs. Pruitt, show
.ny real, prolonged or substantial interest in the welfare
.f the child. Even the mother by her actions preliminary
o the hearing and thereafter upon interrogation in Court,
howed a lack of responsibility to the child. We refer the
~ourt to the transcript, page 9, in this regard. In answer
o the Court's question:
"THE COURT: Well, what do you think would
be the best for them? Do you think it would be
better to go on like it has been going on or do you
think that it would be better to have them in someone else's home?
"SHIRLEY MITCHELL HOLLAND: I don't
know.
"THE COURT: Looking at it from the standpoint of the children, not how you may feel about
it, what do you think?
"SHIRLEY MITCHELL HOLLAND: I guess
they would be better off with someone else. I don't
know."
In the above exchange, it is apparent that the mother herself felt that the best interests of the child would be served
were they placed in the home of another for rearing.
Appellant makes reference to the law on adoptions in
Utah. Respondent fails to see the application of this principle in the case at hand. The question of adoption is not
the real issue in this case. The paramount consideration
in this case is the neglect of a child by a parent.
Respondent wishes to state affirmatively that, contrary to the position taken by appellants, the judgment is
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supported by the evidence and the Court did act well within
its discretion in making findings such as are contained in
the record. Based upon such argument as appellant
sets forth, this Court should not lightly turn aside the considered opinion of the trial judge based upon a careful review of the evidence and records.
From our examination of the record, there appears to
be no substantial attempt on the part of the appellants to
restore the child to the custody of the mother, but rather
to restore the child to the custody of the grandparents. We
refer the Court to the transcript, (T. 30), where the grandmother in answer to a question by Mr. Oliver, states:
"That isn't correct because Shirley has had the
children. It is due to the fact that she has been
negligent to an extent that has brought me forward
to try to make a home for the children so that they
can be together and be raised and live a long life.
They haven't been because they have been back and
forth from one place to another."
We refer the Court to the Welfare Department reports
which have been made a part of this record and to the comment of the Los Angeles case worker on page 2 of the confidential report of the County of Los Angeles Bureau of
Adoptions, dated December 5, 1958, and regarding Pruitt,
Mr. and Mrs. Coy.
The situation as presented by Mr. and Mrs.
Pruitt is as follows: Charlyne was. placed in the
Stelly home by the natural mother approximately
two years ago, and the Stellys have had full custody
and control of the child since that time. The natural
mother apparently, though they did not state this,
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left the child with the Stellys with the understanding
that the child would be adopted by them. Until the
time the Pruitts were notified of the matter pending
in court, they assumed Charlyne had been adopted
by the Stellys. Upon learning that the adoption had
not been completed, they countered the Stellys petition for adoption of Charlyne with one of their own.
I would judge from our conversation with the Pruitts
that their man point of interest is not in adopting
Charlyne, but rather in keeping the two children together. Their feeling as to the Stellys appears to
be mixed. On the one hand they covertly admit that
they are providing a good home for the child; however, overtly they told of rumors none of which have
been verified by. them, as to the neglect of the child
by the Stellys. It might be significant to note that
while they knew these rumors to exist, they did not
go to any lengths to either verify or discount these
rumors. Neither did they take action to determine
the exact status of the child until they were informed
of the instant legal proceeding."
See the report of December 9, 1958 regarding Charlyne
Mitchell and signed by L. R. Roylance, commencing at the
last paragraph of page 1.
"The child has remained in the Stelly home for
a goodly length of time. She has. come to accept Mr.
and Mrs. Stelly as her significant persons. They have
acted in the full meaning of the· parental role for her
and give ample evidence of love and solicitation in
the best interests' of Charlyne. It is my professional
belief that Shirley Mitchell is a full bloom schizophrenic with all the ramifications involved in such
a close diagnosis.. Her behaviour over the past is
indicative of this. Some of her behaviour is a matter
of court record in previous years. Much of it is contained in records maintained at the various agencies
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in this city and hospitals and agencies in other localities. To return the child to the mother would be
very detrimental. To authorize the Pruitts to adopt
the child would in effect return the child to the care
of the mother."
We refer the Court to the body of these reports and to the
general tenor of the recommendations contained therein.

POINT III.
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
LAW.
Respondent fails to see where the conduct of the J uvenile Court in allowing a ten minute recess to examine the
Welfare Department records was in anyway prejudicial to
the rights of the appellants. We find nothing in the transcript of record in which counsel objected to the length. of
the recess or asked for additional time to examine thereports. Further, counsel had the parties to this proceeding
present to testify concerning the reports insofar as such
reports applied to said individuals.
The reports constituted Welfare Department records
and were records of investigations which had previously
been made. Counsel had adequate opportunity to inform
himself concerning the substance of the reports and thereupon examine his witnesses with reference thereto. It is
interesting to respondents to note that a continuance had
previously been granted on the hearing of this matter by
the Juvenile Judge in order to give both the appellant and
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the court an opportunity to examine the Welfare Department reports.
In this proceeding, it appears to the respondent quite
evident that the Court is not being used as a convenient
vehicle to nullify preferential rights of parents. The rights
of parents to the custody of their children are preferential,
it is true, but are in no way absolute where it can be shown
by competent evidence that the parent is not capable of providing or willing to show such parental care as the statute
requires. We submit that the preferential rights of parents
do not, upon being properly subordinated pass to the grandparents. No doubt in a proper case relatives would, by
assuming custody of a child, aid in protecting the best interests of the child. It is for the Court to determine, however, what is a proper case. In the instant circumstance,
the Court has not made such a determination.
It should be emphasized that the Court has made a

specific finding that it is detrimental to the interests of the
child to change the existing placement (R. 9, Finding No.

7).
It is apparent to the respondents that this proceeding
in no way should be construed as. a trial of the Stelly household. The Court's action in awarding custody to the Stellys
was quite secondary to the Court's action of depriving the
mother of such custody. Appellant appears to be dwelling
in speculation when it is suggested that the Stelly household
is not suitable or when it is suggested that any reformation
on the part of Mr. Stelly was motivated by some ulterior
motive in connection with this proceeding.
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Yes, the Pruitts were present at the hearings following
the commencement of this action, and yes, they have shown
some superficial concern for the welfare of their grandchildren, and yes, they have presented themselves to the
scrutiny of the Court and subjected themselves to cross
examination. All of this they have done, but they have done
none of these in any substantial or continuing fashion until
such time as this proceeding was instituted. The record is
replete with suggestions that the Pruitts have heretofore
exercised little, if any, continuing interest in the child, or
that they are motivated by anything other than a desire to
restore the physical custody of the child to their daughter.
We once again refer the Court to the confidential reports
heretofore mentioned. In respondent's opinion, the judgment is entirely supported by the law.

CONCLUSION
We are here considering the future welfare of a child
who thus far in her short period of life has experienced
upheaval after upheaval in being moved from place to place
and subject to evident parental neglect. It was this circumstance that brought the matter to the attention of the Juvenile Court, and it became incumbent upon that Court to
take whatever steps were lawfully within its power to restore some order to the life of this child. The Juvenile Court,
recognizing its moral and legal responsibility to solve the
dilemma which had been presented to it, caused a hearing
to be held in which fair, careful and adeqate consideration
was given to all of the allegations and charges which were
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,rought before it. Based upon such wen considered evidence
.nd being completely mindful of its, responsibility to the
hild and not at all unmindful of the paramount rights of
he parent, the Court thereupon made findings of fact and
onclusions of law and entered a judgment according to the
~vidence presented. The Court has. found in substance that
he best interests of the child can only be served by allowng it to continue in the home in which it had been placed
)y the mother and in which common bonds of affection and
;ies of parental love had been established. The paramount
~ights to be considered in matters of this sort are not those
>f the parent, but are those of the child. It is respectfully
mbmitted that this case is a classic example of what neces!arily must be done by courts of proper authority in dis~osing of problems involving parental neglect of minor
!hildren.
The Court should not quickly be inclined to set aside
;he judgment rendered herein.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,
EARL S. SPAFFORD,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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